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Selected and rare materials, excerpts and observations from ancient, medieval and contemporary authors, travelers and researchers about Cyprus.
 
 
 
 
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CLAUDE DELAVAL COBHAM
Exerpta Cypria
page 135

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CALETTO. 12- lose Venice itself than Cyprus. They were bidden to retire, all of tliein, to the forts and to the mountains, determined as soon as the enemy arrived to fall upon them, and make sine of victory and plunder. Signor Estor Buglione would be the general of the army, nnd the Count de Rochas general of the cavalry. These letters gave great joy to all, and confidence in the goodness of their rulers, the lavish promises and inviolable faith of Venice. Fur they hoped the Signory would choose and send with.all speed the best possible Lieutenant, a man fit to rule the island iu so terrible an emergency, seeing that the present Lieutenant had completed his term uf uftice, nnd that all Venice was well aware of his incompetence. They hoped too that a Proveditore wuuld be sent them with the highest qualifications for so important a trust ; for the Signor}* had received news of the death of Lorenzo Bembo, an event deplorable in itself, and the cause of the loss of Cyprus. Yet again they hoped for α fully efficient force of valiant Italian soldiers, with fitting officers, for the foe was very strong, the island far from Venice aud surrounded by Turkish lands, and the capital was so placed in its midst that once the enemy was camped round it, no help could reach it, and they founded these hopes npon the liberal offers made by the Signory, on their vigilance and affectionate advice ; remembering that when they first began to fortify the city, upon the smallest sign of suspicion the Signory had sent them an ample garrison. Now that they were really entering upon the war, and declaring themselves the open enemies of so potent a sovereign, as the city had eleven bastions, which were so many forts, they held it indispensable that Venice should send, if not ten thousand troops, at least five hundred soldiers for each bastion, especially as they knew that the lower and peasant classes in Cyprus were rade folk and unskilled iu war. While they waited the fulfilment of these hopes, they devoted themselves with extraordinary diligence to the completion of the fortifications, which iu some parts were still without a curtain. They began then with processions in which everyone joined, Latins and Greeks, bishops and monks, the officials, nobles, and persons of every class and nation. Throughout Lent Signor Estor Baglione, with all Iris officers and soldiers, after processions made and masses sung, went out together tu work, carrying the earth dug out of the new ditches to fill up the old, so that the enemy might not find tronches ready made to their hand. Before the enemy landed the fortress was nearly complete, though the garrison had not time to make certain traverses, which were necessary to mask the guns of the fort, such as the Turks, on their side, were able to make afterwards on the hill of S. Marina. At this juncture Signor Estor Baglioue summoned the parliament or council, and proposed to the Government, first by word of mouth, and then in writing, that it were not less advantageous than necessary to march down to the seacoast, and there to make a stand against the foe, to test their own strength, and to harass him as much as possible. Many times he offered the same advice, and beat up the ordinary cavalry and a few extra horses for his company, which he wished to equip with several arquebusses apiece, after the fashion of "feraroli," so that at least the enemy should not find landing an easy and comfortable affair. The nobles, and indeed all the people, thought the plan excellent. They wrote a most spirited letter, which their agents presented to the Signory, setting forth their relation to the Repnblic, together with the very strong reasons for turning to account their enthusiasm and material forces in a inarch to the seacoast, there to try every means to prevent the enemy's landing, or at least to throw his troops into disorder. How veiy reasonable this scheme was will be evident when it is remembered that with the horses in Cyprus, counting also mules, which are admirably suited for arquebusiers, a force of five or six thousand

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